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Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the metaphor of art as person should be implemented as a way to
understand artistic interaction, such that the relationship between artworks and spectators should
be understood as one between persons. I begin this argument by first juxtaposing Hans-Georg
Gadamer’s notion of aesthetic representation with the values that constitute correlative person in
Confucianism. This juxtaposition draws similarities between artworks and persons that make the
metaphor of art as person a plausible means for understanding artistic interaction. I then appeal
to Michel Foucault for two significant reasons: his subjectfication of the self solidifies the
comparisons made between Gadamer and Confucianism, and his aesthetics of existence builds
upon the metaphor of art as person by allowing artworks to be understood as ethical subjects.
Once the metaphor has been thoroughly explicated, I address its moral implications, making it
clear that current discussions in Western aesthetics and ethics should be reevaluated. Instead, one
should adopt a perspective of self-cultivation, such as is discussed in Foucault and
Confucianism, when one is interacting with artworks. With this stated, the prescriptive notions
put forth by Foucault are expounded upon through Chinese aesthetic practices more generally
and then through the Confucian ethical values discussed before in order to provide an alternative
set of guidelines by which to interact with art.

vi

Introduction

We are surrounded by art. Whether we travel to other countries, visit museums, attend concerts,
read books or just watch television, nearly every day of each of our lives consists of some form
of aesthetic engagement. Many thinkers and philosophers have pondered upon the nature of art,
wondering what it is that constitutes aesthetic value and questioning whether it corrupts or
enhances our lives. In the West especially, artists and philosophers alike have speculated upon
the constitution of the aesthetic, wondering what the defining essence is that lies at the core of art
qua art. Are artworks merely forms of mimesis as the Greeks claimed, imitations of reality that
replicate the beautiful nature of being while also distancing themselves from it? If so, are they
potential sources of misguidance that can lead people away from truth and the good if people do
not "imitate from childhood what is appropriate for them" and what will lead to the good life? 1
Or are artworks the source of aesthetic value, such that beauty in the world follows the artist's
interpretation of nature as a source of inspiration? Does such an aesthetic perspective as this give
life its value, transforming people into creatures of creativity and ingenuity that are able to
impart beauty and meaning unto an otherwise empty world? Maybe artworks reside somewhere
in between these two extremes, both shaping and being shaped by the world around them,
cultivating people's dispositions both positively and negatively with respect to the aspects of the

Plato, Republic III, 395c; found in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson, trans.
G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve, 971-1223, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 1033.
1

artworks themselves, the perspective of the viewers and the entire context of these artistic
interactions more generally.
This latter understanding of artworks is what I appeal to in this paper by introducing the
notion of art as person. What this notion entails is that the interactions between spectators and
artworks should be understood as if they were interactions between persons. However, this is not
meant to be an Aristotelian ontological claim, for such a claim would require delving into deep
metaphysical speculations concerned with the nature of 'art' and 'personhood' as definite
philosophical categories. Instead, I approach artworks and persons from a perspective of
contextuality, focusing on philosophical notions that do not abstract these categories from their
context but integrate them entirely into the world. Within this contextual framework, 'art' and
'personhood' would not represent any definite or concrete essence, but would instead each give a
name to relatable aspects of a contextual totality so as to provide a foundation for discussion and
understanding. Thus any ontological claims that I could make for the integration of 'art' into the
realm of 'personhood' are not necessary because these realms, within the notions of contextuality
appealed to in this paper, would have no concrete presence in the world. It may be possible to
fully integrate 'art' into 'personhood' within the relational ontologies appealed to in this paper, for
both are malleable categories that may be altered and adapted, but the claims that I make for art
as person do not require such a leap. Instead, one may understand art as person as a heuristic
metaphor for artistic interaction, which utilizes similarities between the provisional categories of
'art' and 'personhood' in order to make claims concerning the relationship between artworks and
spectators.
In making these claims, I address the thoughts and notions of numerous thinkers within
different philosophical traditions. The foundations for the metaphor of art as person are
2

constructed through a juxtaposition of aesthetic representation as it is discussed in the works of
Hans-Georg Gadamer with correlative personhood within the Confucian tradition. These two
notions allow artworks and persons to resonate with each other significantly enough for my
claims in support of art as person to be made. Once the details of art as person are presented, the
second chapter introduces the thoughts of Michel Foucault concerning the subjectification of the
self so that I may use them to solidify the connections made between Gadamer's artwork and
Confucianism's person. This solidification is followed by the introduction of Foucault's
aesthetics of existence, which I dissect and reappropriate so that its claims may be applied
inversely to art as person. Just as Foucault claims that persons should be understood as works of
art, I argue that artworks to be understood as ethical subjects in their interactions with spectators.
The last chapter of this paper is spent explicating current trends in the ethical criticism of art and
contrasting them with the concerns of art as person. These concerns are then formulated through
various Chinese aesthetic practices, such as calligraphy and painting. The ethical aspects of those
Confucian values introduced at the beginning of this paper are then appealed to in order to
provide the metaphor of art as person with a framework for interacting with artworks as ethical
subjects.

3

I
Juxtaposing Gadamer and Confucianism

As its heading suggests, this first chapter focuses on the juxtaposition of Gadamer’s claims for
the aesthetic with Confucianism’s understanding of the correlative person. I spend much of this
chapter explicating the essential aspects of each as concerns the claims made in this paper—such
as the origination and location of the aesthetic as representation in a complex conglomeration of
contextual historicity, or the subordination of individuality to roles and relationships for the
correlative person—so that, in being placed side-by-side, similarities between them may begin to
arise on their own. After they have been sufficiently represented, however, I use the final section
of this chapter to conduct a thorough comparison of them, and argue that Gadamer’s artwork and
Confucianism’s person resonate in such a way that personhood may be adopted as a metaphor
for understanding the depth of aesthetic representation. Thus, in the Gadamarian style, the
metaphor of art as person is developed, which provides an alternative hermeneutic approach to
art and aesthetic interaction.

Play and Conversation in Gadamer’s Aesthetic
According to Gadamer, thinkers during the Enlightenment began to perceive the aesthetic in
opposition to rationality, causing art to be disregarded as something capable of displaying truth.
Following the Enlightenment, thinkers during the Romantic period utilized this rational
abandonment of art by abstracting the aesthetic as something autonomous and intrinsically
4

valuable. Beauty thus became disconnected from the world in what may be called the "pure work
of art."1 In opposition to this rational abandonment and romantic idealization of the aesthetic,
Gadamer proclaims that art is capable of displaying truth, "truth which is certainly different from
that of science but just as certainly is not inferior to it."2 Rather than being autonomous, as
Romantics would like to believe it to be, this understanding of art is instead dependent upon the
entirety of its context—historical, cultural, social—and its truth is concerned with contextual
development and experience. As he further expands upon these claims, Gadamer introduces
numerous metaphorical notions that, in their nature as metaphors, seem to say something about
the aesthetic that could not be properly said, if it could be said at all, through a completely
rational and structural linguistic medium (which itself seems to aid Gadamer's claim for aesthetic
truth). These notions, as well as their metaphorical composition, construct a hermeneutical
approach to the aesthetic that begins the breakdown of its status as a distanced ideal and its
integration into the world.
To begin, Gadamer first discusses the notion of play. Play, for Gadamer, is a back-andforth relationship between players, with no definite goal beyond that which develops amongst
these players as they play. It is an interactivity that is essential everywhere, for all things play,
adapting and progressing through this "to and fro of constantly repeated movement."3 Now what
is called art or aesthetic comes into being when the players are dissolved and become merely
aspects of play. What this means is that play itself moves to the fore and subordinates the players,
such that the game becomes prioritized over those playing it. In this dissolution, play is

1
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd ed., (New York:
Continuum, 1975), 74.
2
Ibid., 84.
3
Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays, ed. Robert Bernasconi, trans. Nicholas
Walker, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 22.
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transformed into a play; this distinction becomes clearer when one understands the wordplay
occurring between the verb ‘play’ as interaction and the noun ‘play’ as theatrical literature and
performance. Thus the playful interactive relationship between players becomes unified as play
itself, shifting the relationship from one between players to one between a play and a spectator—
and just as the back-and-forth of players constitutes the essence of play, that between a play and
a spectator constitutes the essence of art and the aesthetic. In other words, for an artwork to be
fully conceived of as aesthetic it must be presented to a spectator, which consists of anything
from stage performances for an audience to public displays of statues or paintings to the private
reading of literature; it could be argued that anything presented to a spectator as such possesses
aesthetic being. This representation of a play to a spectator—as opposed to play's initial selfpresentation in being constituted as such through the interaction of players—is what allows it to
achieve its status as aesthetic.4 As a result of this, the spectator, as the one to whom the play is
presented, becomes necessarily present as an aspect of the aesthetic, just as players are dissolved
into play.
Understanding that the essence of the aesthetic lies within the play of artworks and
spectators, one must develop an approach to art different from that of the Enlightenment and
Romantic periods as they are described by Gadamer. One may no longer appeal to the
transcendent standards of a pure aesthetic but must instead interact with artworks that are
contextually located and in constant motion. One may make this shift by implementing the
metaphorical notion of the hermeneutical conversation.5 For Gadamer, understanding is
achieved through language. What this implies is that in order for understanding to occur there

4
5

Gadamer, Truth and Method, 108-9.
Ibid., 389.
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must be a genuine conversation between partners, what may appropriately be called play with
words, that seeks to perpetuate further understanding through the back-and-forth of sincere
dialogue. Through this, play may be understood in communicative terms—players as speakers
and listeners, play as conversation. Though this understanding of communication is quite literal
within the play of persons, its nature as metaphor becomes significant for play within the
aesthetic dimension, at which point the conversation becomes one between artworks and
spectators. This has many implications for Gadamer, one being that artworks separate themselves
from their creators, such that “someone who has produced a work of art stands before the
creation of his hands in just the same way that anyone else does.”6 Instead, artworks must be
understood as a result of the entirety of their context, an idea Gadamer discusses through the
notion of decoration. Every artwork “is not really removed from the decorative context, but
serves to heighten representationally a context of life with which it is decoratively consonant.”7
So as contexts change artworks become consonant with different people, different places and
different ideals. However, being so entirely contextualized does not mean that the artwork is not
itself meaningful in anyway, such that the spectator's interpretation is entirely subjective.
Actually, it may be argued that this vast complexity of contextual influences invests the artwork
with a unique presence that not only provides it with complex meaning but allows it to
“heighten” or increase the quality of its context in return. In this, the notion of play itself is
exemplified; as a result of the to and fro of an immeasurable number of influences, the artwork
can only be fully understood in itself, for no one influence can capture the entirety of its complex
contextual composition. So once the various aspects of a particular artwork’s context have

6
7

Gadamer, Relevance of the Beautiful, 33.
Gadamer, Truth and Method, 150.
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dissolved into it, as players do into play, the spectator is able to enter into a conversation with it
and begin the mutual arousal of understanding through communicative interaction.
Before moving on to the next section, I should make some final remarks concerning the
various art forms, for the applicability of play and conversation may be easier to find in some
more than others. Concerning the performance arts, Gadamer’s hermeneutic approach seems
quite compatible; their contextuality can be seen quite boldly in their presentation, for each
performance is altered and restructured by the players involved. In opposition to the fluid arts of
the stage, however, there is what Gadamer calls the picture, art that is detached from "the
particular conditions of our approach to it." 8 The picturesque arts—paintings, sculptures,
photographs, films—remain the same, in a sense, each time they are presented. It may initially be
thought that they lack the capacity for play because of their stillness in presentation. However,
this perception of the picture arises out of a pure, autonomous aesthetic. If the picture is instead
understood as being embedded within its context, its nature as representation shows itself.
Gadamer clarifies this in his analysis of the portrait. As artworks that seem to merely copy some
original for some political or social purpose, portraits do not seem to possess any contextual
being of their own, instead merely directing one’s attention toward their original source.
However, this is not the case, for "the original acquires an image only in being imaged," meaning
that in picturing someone the portrait puts forth a representation of that someone, changing the
way one is perceived as “original.”9 The result is similar for the other picturesque art forms as
well, for they introduce something new into the world through the representation of some
original. This process not only grants being to the picture but alters and augments how the

8
9

Ibid., 131.
Ibid., 137.
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original is perceived, leading to an “increase of being” in the world.10
Alongside this is Gadamer’s notion of literature, which distinguishes itself as the art form
composed of words and thus that most capable of ‘speaking’ for itself. This brings up a potential
problem for the other art forms, for they may now seem to be subject entirely to interpretation
and relative as hermeneutic objects. However, the other art forms ‘speak’ for themselves as well.
Just as play may be understood in communicative terms, language may be understood in terms of
play, meaning that such a hermeneutic conversation as occurs between artworks and spectators
need not be linguistic. Artworks communicate their meanings and ideas in whatever ways are
applicable to them, through “the language of form and content,” which spectators must come to
understand “so that communication really occurs.”11 Thus the metaphors of play and
communication seem to possess the capacity to reside within all art forms, static or fluid,
linguistic or picturesque.

Confucian Correlative Persons
In contemporary comparative discussions on classical Chinese philosophy, emphasis has been
placed on analyzing the Chinese tradition more carefully. One must attempt to understand this
tradition as it presents itself while also recognizing that one's Western biases are always present
(surely an approach that shares with Gadamer elements of hermeneutic sensitivity). As a result of
such analyses, the Chinese tradition has come to be understood as one grounded upon a
correlative cosmology, one in which the predominant metaphysical aspects of Western
philosophy—such as transcendent principles, unchanging essences or strict dichotomous

10
11

Ibid., 135.
Gadamer, Relevance of the Beautiful, 52.
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categories—are not present. Instead, the empirical world of change is the most real, which results
in an understanding of the world that differs in many significant ways from Western traditions:
instead of categorizations there are adaptable heuristic metaphors; instead of isolated essences
there are collaborations between microcosmic particulars within their macrocosmic context; and
instead of moral principles there are constant adaptations and appropriations of action within an
always-changing context, which are made in reference to images of particular moral exemplars.
It is well-accepted amongst many comparative scholars that the foundational elements of such a
cosmology can be found within the Yijing, or the Book of Changes, an ancient divination manual
that became an influential text for the Chinese philosophical tradition after the addition of ten
interpretive commentaries. Of the Yijing, Karyn Lai states the following:
[W]hat is interesting about this text are its initial assumptions about the world, the
connections between its different parts, the relationships between entities, the complexity
of causes and effects, the place of humanity in a constantly transforming world, and the
importance of individual actions and responses.12
Thus the foundations of Chinese thought emphasize the development of personhood as central,
for persons must be capable of appropriating themselves within their context, and defining
themselves through their relationships with their world and with each other. Being particularly
person-centered, Confucianism also utilizes many of the declarations of persons discussed in the
Yijing, implementing an intricate system of values for understanding and defining the correlative
person.
One may argue that the foundational value of correlative personhood in Confucianism is
ren (仁). Many scholars of Chinese philosophy believe the etymology of this term to be
significant to its meaning. The character for ren is composed of two parts, ren (人) and er (二),

12

Karyn L. Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 11.
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the former meaning ‘person’ and the latter meaning ‘two.’ Interpretations of this etymology
claim that it is meant to clarify the nature of persons, such that persons are defined in relation to
one another and cannot exist on their own.13 More recent archeological discoveries have also
found ren to be composed of the character for an impregnated body, shen (身), and the character
xin (心), which may be translated as 'heart-mind.' Though the meaning behind these characters
and their connectivity is complex, some have the opinion that it is meant to depict "the kind of
concern one might extend to a pregnant women," portraying the intimacy required of relationally
constituted persons.14
There have been many translations of ren, such as ‘benevolence’ or ‘humaneness,’ but
these translations are loaded with Western connotations that make the uniquely Chinese aspects
of this value difficult to uncover. 'Authoritative conduct' and 'consummate person' seem to
capture better what it entails. First, the nature of authoritativeness is two-fold, implying not only
authority but authorship as well. The aspect of authority makes clear the emphasis within ren on
the cultivation of influence, such that the authoritative person is like the North Star, which
“dwells in its place, and the multitude of stars pay tribute to it.”15 In cultivating authority, one is
able to inspire action and evoke change in one’s roles and relationships, meaning that one may
now alter and adapt them appropriately, thus becoming an author of one's context and of one’s
own personhood.16 Secondly, consummate conduct requires "irreducible relationality" and
togetherness, denoted through the prefix 'con-,’ and portrays a sense of completion that is not

For examples of such an etymological analysis, see Lai, Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 21; Roger T. Ames
and Henry Rosemont, Jr., trans., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, (New York: Ballantine
Books, 1998), 48; David B. Wong, “Relational and Autonomous Selves,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 31:4
(2004): 421.
14
Roger T. Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2011), 177.
15
Ames, Analects, 76 - Passage 2.1.
16
For more on 'authoritative conduct,' see Ames, Analects, 48-51.
13
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goal-oriented but focused on personal accomplishment and maturation, denoted through the
Greek root summa, both of which are pinnacle to understanding what ren entails.17 It is through
ren that the individuality of the person is formed, for out of the complexity of relationships arises
an entity capable of improving the world, whose uniqueness resides in being the only one
constituted by his or her particular set of roles and relationships. This idea is explained further by
Ames, who claims that “it is an adaptive correlation of the demands and the rewards of these
roles, even when conflicted and in tension, that gives me an increasingly focused and persistent
identity as a person.”18 In other words, each of our roles and relationships makes us unique, and
our identity as individuals becomes more complex with each relationship we have. If one
cultivates an awareness of one’s placement within a particular context, one may focus what may
initially be perceived as a collection of roles into a unique role-possessing entity capable of
introducing new perspectives into the world.
Similar to how persons are constituted and understood correlatively, Confucianism’s
central values also cannot exist in isolation but must appeal to each other if they are to be
understood in their entirety. So if one is to cultivate oneself consummately as an authority of
one's context, one must come to understand li (禮), or what may be translated as “ritual
propriety.”19 Though ritual in the West may have particular connotations as something
constricting, rituals as they are practiced within the Confucian tradition are not understood as
such. Instead, they must abide by their context, adapting as is appropriate for the well-being of
people and for the cultivation of ren. Passage 9.3 of the Analects displays such an understanding
of ritual:
For more on 'consummate person,' see Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 179.
Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 175-6.
19
Ames, Analects, 51-2.
17
18
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The Master said, "The use of a hemp cap is prescribed in observance of ritual propriety (li
禮). Nowadays, that a silk cap is used instead is a matter of frugality. I would follow
accepted practice on this. A subject kowtowing on entering the hall is prescribed in the
observance of ritual propriety (li 禮). Nowadays that one kowtows only after ascending
the hall is a matter of hubris. Although it goes contrary to accepted practice, I still
kowtow on entering the hall."20
In this passage there are two instances that exemplify the two key aspects of ritual propriety.
First, there is a contextually appropriate adaptation of a particular ritualistic practice—replacing
hemp caps with silk caps because they are cheaper. Second, there is a contextually inappropriate
adaptation—kowtowing after ascending the hall, as opposed to before, out of hubris. Such rituals
are not immutable principles that are applicable in all situations but are instead meant to be
appropriated as their context changes, for it may be the case that what was at one time beneficial
is at another damaging. Thus it is the job of persons to cultivate within themselves the capacity to
read their context and know what actions are appropriate in each situation they find themselves
in.
The Confucian cannon is composed of numerous other values, which if analyzed
thoroughly could compose the entirety of this paper. However, he (和) should be discussed, for it
is significant when concerned with the correlative nature of things. This value has been
translated in the past as ‘harmony.’ Even though this may be the most accurate English
translation possible, the depth of the value in the Confucian and Chinese tradition needs to be
addressed. As it is typically understood, harmony is concerned with the resolution of dissonance.
However, as Ames states, “he 和 is not simply the mutual accommodation of difference that
attenuates discord, but more importantly, the creative and productive outcome when such

20

Ibid., 76 - Passage 9.3.
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differences are coordinated with optimum effect.”21 What this means is that he not only resolves
discord within relationships but also arouses creativity amongst them. For the Confucians, music
and food are the two analogies that most accurately represent what he entails. In the creation of
music, various notes are played together to create chords, which arouse a sensation within the
listener that no one note could. Similarly, when making soup, one mixes various spices and foodstuff together in a pot of hot water, which results in a delicious meal if the ingredients are
proportioned properly. This is what is meant by correlativity. One must both cultivate oneself
through ren and appropriate one’s actions through li to cultivate others if one is to properly
become a person. However, it is only through the harmony of these relationships themselves that
one may even begin to cultivate them in the first place.

Art as Person
The notions of Gadamer and values of Confucianism discussed above differ from one another in
many ways, for they reside within different traditions with different philosophical and cultural
backgrounds. While Gadamer attempts to present a contextually based understanding of being as
an alternative to the autonomy of Cartesian and Kantian traditions, Confucianism finds itself
within a tradition that initially assumed perpetual contextuality to be the most real, so it can be
assumed that the concerns of each differ in many respects. However, though they are distant
from one another in their traditional foundations, they also seem to resonate with each other in
some interesting ways, such that they may be able to produce something innovative together. To
use the language of Gadamer, these two traditions may be able to arouse understanding in

21

Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 169.
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conversation as opposed to being relatively confined to their particular origins, but must first be
appreciated in themselves if this is to happen. So in its essence, the argument for art as person
appeals to the correlative nature of both Gadamer’s artwork and Confucianism’s person, such
that the composition of a person in Confucianism and the aspects that define one as such may
apply also to artworks as aesthetic representation.
Before this is pursued further, however, the disclaimer from the introduction should be
reiterated. It is not this paper’s intention to make any ontological claims for the nature of the
aesthetic as a categorical aspect of personhood. Whether artworks could literally be redefined as
persons or not would require a deep analysis of the ontological status of art and of personhood
that this paper will not and does not wish to make. What this paper does intend to do is introduce
a heuristic metaphor through which one may understand what occurs between artworks and
spectators. Looking toward the nature of Gadamer’s metaphorical notions may clarify what this
means. Upon introducing the hermeneutical conversation, it was not Gadamer’s intention to
claim that artworks literally speak, or change their minds, or consciously reflect upon themselves
and their world as people do in conversation. Instead, Gadamer was concerned with describing
the phenomenon of aesthetic interaction for the people spectating. To properly understand an
artwork, the work does not need to actually speak. However, the spectator must approach it as if
it does, because in its contextual complexity an artwork can only be properly understood in itself.
The claim for art as person is of a similar metaphorical nature. In utilizing correlative
personhood as a metaphor for artistic interaction, an alternative conceptualization of aesthetic
representation is uncovered that may not have been recognized otherwise.
With the nature of its intentions stated, my argument should begin as directly as possible,
namely through a direct comparison of those notions and values introduced above. As has been
15

stated, the argument for art as person is grounded upon correlativity as it is embodied within
Gadamer and Confucianism. Though the correlative aspects of Confucianism have been
explicated in detail, their presence within Gadamer’s aesthetic has not been made so obvious, but
an analysis of play will bring them to the forefront. Play, as discussed previously, is an
interaction between players, a back-and-forth movement that fosters constant innovation. For
Gadamer, language is that through which play commences, for understanding is only achieved
through genuine conversation. As conversations progress ideas collide and from this collision
something new is introduced into the world, engendered by a mutual understanding between two
conversing partners. Looking toward these aspects of play and language concerned with
innovation and an increase of being, complements to them within the Confucian tradition may be
discovered through comparative analysis. One may argue that correlativity in Confucianism is
communicative, for such relationships result in constant adaptations and innovations in
understanding for those within them. Likewise, one may argue that play for Gadamer is
correlative, for such understanding as is fostered through communication transforms those
communicating as well as their context. This becomes interesting when the play is between
artworks and spectators, for in these interactions play is no longer a literal conversation between
persons but still arouses understating mutually as if it were. However, though the play of the
aesthetic fosters understanding communicatively, more must be stated if artworks, in relation to
their spectators, are to be understood correlatively in the same way that Confucian persons are.
To address the potential for aesthetic correlativity, it is appropriate to appeal to the central
notions of Confucianism, for they are concerned with the development of persons and dictate
how personhood should be understood within a correlative framework. It is through ren that
persons cultivate themselves consummately as authorities and begin to author their relationships
16

and their context. Similarly, masterful artworks garner much esteem from their spectators and are
able to alter those with whom they converse as well as increase being within their context in
representing aspects of it, as was discussed through Gadamer’s notion of the picture. In
respecting li, persons are able to appropriate their actions and the rituals practiced within their
context, such that relationships may be cultivated through them. Artworks, for Gadamer, are also
appropriating themselves within their context, attaining new and retaining old meanings when
relevant, which was described before as a heightening of their decorative context. Confucian
relationships, however, are not merely concerned with resolving dissonance, as was discussed
through he, but with mutual productivity engendered through the relationships themselves, such
that relationships are able to transform the entirety of their context, like how various ingredients
in harmony together create a delicious bowl of soup. A similar understanding of relational
interaction can be found in play, for play itself—in its medial position between the players—
arouses innovation among them that they could not bring about as autonomous, isolated agents.
Apart from the particularities of the specific notions and values within Gadamer’s aesthetic and
Confucianism’s person, similarities may also be found between each at a foundational level. The
correlative cosmology on which Confucianism is grounded manifests the world in what may be
considered a playful way. In the Yijing, the world is understood to be composed entirely of
transformations and the interconnectivity of various entities at various moments—and
personhood for the Confucians is a result of cultivating these interactions within this perpetual
change into entities that do not merely drift along the cycle but evoke change within it. Play also
resides amongst the many things in the world—such as through "the play of light” or "the play of
waves” —and it is through play that entities are developed, for as players dissolve into their
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games the games themselves attain being.22 It is through conversation that understanding is
fostered and that the aesthetic is brought into existence, developing spectators and artworks that
may both alter their context in relation to one another.
As I made clear at the beginning of this section, it is not this paper's intention to argue for
an ontological paradigm shift that would literally conceptualize artworks as persons. However, I
do wish for the depth of my proposed metaphor to be understood, which may mean pushing the
boundaries between the literal and the figurative, just as it seems that Gadamer's artworks, in
some sense, actually speak. Now Gadamer believes that play and language are the means by
which the aesthetic attains being and Confucians believe that persons are constituted by their
roles and relationships. Concerning this, Henry Rosemont makes an interesting insight, though
he may not have intended to, when he states that "early Confucians would insist that I would not
play or perform, but am and become the roles I live in consonance with others."23 In relation to
the notions and values explicated thus far in this paper, this claim seems to state that play is not
typically understood to be quite as constitutive as correlative personhood is within the Confucian
tradition. However, as it has been argued in the development of art as person, play within the
aesthetic should be considered to constitute its being. What this means is that the aesthetic, in
being formed by the play of artworks and spectators, is relationally constituted just as correlative
person are. Thus, if my comparative analyses have been represented properly, there does not
seem to be much difference between the composition of an artwork and of a person besides how
they are physically composed. This brings to mind David Wong's statement that it may be best
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"to take the one who stands in all the self’s relationships as a biological organism," just as one
may understand paint and a canvas to stand in all of some artwork's aesthetic relationships.24
What this entails is that persons are only the sum of their relationships and individuality is
formed through the creativity engendered within each unique relational set, but it can be argued
that artworks possess these constitutive aspects as well. Now there may be various responses and
rebukes to these claims as concerns the ontological status of 'art' and 'personhood,' but it is not
the goal of this paper to defend against them or pursue them any further. I only want to make it
clear that aesthetic interaction and communication between persons may actually be correlated in
a much deeper sense than has been previously understood. In evoking innovation through their
playful relationships and in possessing a contextually-composed being, the interactions between
artworks and spectators should be viewed and judged as if they were relationships between
persons.
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II
A Foucauldian Perspective

In the previous chapter, I argued that the metaphor of art as person offers an alternative, and
potentially more appropriate, perspective on artistic interaction. Both personhood as it is
understood within a Confucian context and art as it is represented for Gadamer resonate with one
another in their correlative constitutions in such a way that spectators, when interacting with
artworks, should approach them as if they were persons. With the nature of this metaphor laid
out, a Foucauldian perspective is now incorporated into it in order to further define it and
expound upon its implications. Foucault has been specifically chosen as a third contributor to
this metaphor for two significant reasons. First, Foucault may be situated properly as an
intermediary between the Gadamarian and Confucian notions and values discussed previously.
Foucault's subjectification of the self, as well as his contributions as a philosopher of language,
develop notions that are relatable in significant ways to Gadamer, Confucianism, and the
correlation this paper makes between them. This may also allow for further communication
between the Chinese and the Western aspects of this comparative concept by making deeper
cross-cultural connections, through Foucault, between Western thought and Confucianism.
Secondly, there is present in the works of Foucault an aesthetic notion similar to that argued for
within this paper, but which approaches the topic from a different angle. What may be called the
aesthetics of existence in Foucault seeks to create the person as a work of art and sets up the
means by which one may understand what this entails. In positing this aesthetics of existence,
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Foucault intertwines the aesthetic with the person, making it clear that the latter should be
approached through the former. This chapter develops this further, arguing that the former should
be approached through the latter as well.

Foucault as Intermediary
Concerning the arguments presented for art as person, Foucault provides an interesting
perspective as one situated between those notions and values discussed previously for the
aesthetic and for personhood. Though his understanding of the aesthetic and of personhood may
not coincide entirely with that of Gadamer and Confucianism, Foucault has similar ideas that he
is able to bring together in a way that may provide further clarity to the interconnectivity of the
ideas that this paper has put forth thus far. If this interconnectivity is to be properly understood, I
must make a thorough integrative analysis that locates where Foucault's notions intertwine and
where the notions and values of Gadamer and Confucianism fit into this interconnection. I do
this by addressing both the Gadamer and Confucianism separately in comparison to Foucault and
then bringing them together again, granting art as person improved clarity through a new
tripartite status.

1.

Of those two philosophical frameworks discussed in the last chapter, Confucianism

should be addressed first, for it is the most distant in its cultural differences and may be
comparatively analyzed further so as to discover the ways in which it may resonate within a
Western framework. One of the most significant aspects of similarity between Foucauldian
thought and Confucianism is that the self is not autonomous. Of Foucault's self, Marli Huijer
states that "the individual is not a fixed reality…but a historical, cultural and linguistic
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construction (or fiction), which comes about in the process of speaking, acting and thinking."1
Through this understanding of the person, one may already notice the differences between
Foucault and Confucianism, for the Confucian person would not be considered a "fiction."
However, as a philosopher grounded in Kantian and Cartesian traditions, Foucault's intentions in
labeling the individual as a fiction may be understood as resisting the particular sensation of
transcendent autonomy that the individual feels within a Western framework, which is typically
attributed to something fundamentally separate from the world, like a soul. With this in mind,
Foucault's conception of a historically and culturally constituted individuality does not seem so
drastically distant from the contextuality of the Confucian person. However, the Confucian
person is correlative, meaning one is constituted by one's relationships to others, and this must be
accounted for if Foucault is to be integrated properly into a Confucian framework.
If one analyzes the depth of Foucault, relational aspects similar to those in Confucianism
may be discovered, though they are conceived in a different manner, namely as true-and-false
games and power relations. Power, for Foucault, is not necessarily concerned with dominance
and control as one may initially envision 'power' to be. Instead, one may understand it as "a
plurality of intentions that perpetually clash and struggle, so that change continually occurs," as
"actions that provoke reactions," such that "the subjectivity that comes into being in the interplay
of power and resistance consists of a changeable collection of fragments among which the
struggle between powers and resistances takes place."2 Just as was stated previously, there are
many differences here between Foucault's notion of power and Confucian correlationality. While
Foucault tends to depict his notions through strong and almost violent combative terminology—
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such that one "analyz[es] power relations through the antagonism of strategies"3—Confucianism
tends toward [s]ystems of aesthetic order," which "place a great deal of emphasis on
relationships between constituent elements and sensitivity to change."4 However, underneath
this there are numerous aspects of Foucault's thought that relate well with what has been
discussed of Confucianism thus far. The clashes and struggles of power possess aspects similar
to Confucian hierarchical roles and relations, such that both provoke perpetual change. The
former, through allegiance and resistance, are able to shift power relations just as the latter,
through acceptance and remonstrance, are able to locate themselves within various roles upon
various hierarchical levels. Thus, for Foucault, a "changeable collection of fragments" come
together into a unified "subjectivity" just as a collection of relationships come together to
compose the unique individuality of the Confucian person. These similarities become even
clearer through the introduction of true-and-false games. Such truths as compose these games are
not absolute or principled truths, but "truths I express about myself," such that one "experiences
[one]self as a father, a Christian, an artist, a Conservative and so forth."5 In coming to understand
these truths, one begins to identify oneself as an individual composed of various truths and
falsehoods, both of which are malleable and subject to change. This form of identification brings
one even closer to Confucianism's role-possessing person, for Confucian persons develop their
identity in a similar way, namely by understanding themselves within their roles, such as being a
father or a mother.
To provide further clarity to this comparison, one may compare ren in Confucianism with
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what Foucault calls "the cultivation of the self" in order to show that both not only understand
the person to be constituted in a similar fashion but also seek to cultivate this person in a similar
way.6 In the previous chapter, ren was introduced as authoritative conduct and consummate
personhood, such that the person must cultivate oneself consummately as an author of and
authority within one’s context, and in doing so must also cultivate others through one's
relationships with them. In The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3, Foucault discusses sexuality in the
Hellenistic and Roman worlds, and how the sexual austerity practiced in these periods was not a
result of strict transcendental prescriptions, as it was later in the Christian world, but of selfrestraint and discipline as concerned the social developments occurring at the time. Foucault
analyzes such institutions as marriage and politics in order to show how one conceived of oneself
in relation to one's wife or as a member of the political realm. Instead of understanding political
activity as merely participating or abstaining from certain political actions, one should instead
understand it as a complex process of self-cultivation, the depth of which Foucault describes as
follows:
The latter concerned the manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject
in the entire sphere of social, political and civic activities.…It also concerned the rules
that must be applied when engaged in them, and the way in which one ought to govern
oneself in order to take one's place among others, assert one's legitimate share of
authority, and in general situate oneself in the complex and shifting interplay of relations
of command and subordination.7
The practices of self-cultivation described here, like those of Confucian ren, involve constant
contextual appropriation, such that one must form oneself in relation to others just as the
Confucian person must appropriate oneself according to one's relationships.
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One aspect of cultural difference that should be addressed here is Foucault's specific
appeal to Greco-Roman traditions as the source for his understanding of self-cultivation. In
comparing Confucianism within Foucault's aesthetics of existence, Nicholas Gier states that
classical Western tradition "generally followed Aristotle in his claim that reason is the essence of
being human" whereas Confucian's placed "virtuous relationality rather than rational autonomy"
at the center of personhood.8 Thus is seems that while Confucian relationality is essential to the
constitution of the person the Greco -Roman framework would "put care of the self before care
of others," such that others become a means to cultivating the self as opposed to being an
intimate part of the self.9 However, even though Foucault used the thoughts and texts of the
classical Western world as a catalyst for making his claims for self-cultivation, one may argue
that they are uniquely Foucault's and do not fit properly in their entirety within this classical
Western framework. Andrew Thacker states that the only contents currently available in the
West for Foucault's self-cultivation, "those of the Greeks or of Kant, are clearly unacceptable."10
So though Foucault's may not coincide perfectly with Confucian practices of cultivation, they are
not merely historical reiterations of these Greek ideals of rational autonomy either, for it has
been show that Foucault's does not agree with the notion of an autonomous self. This may allow
Confucianism to communicate with Foucault in interesting ways. To compare ren and Foucault's
cultivation of the self, both seem to be concerned with practices of self-cultivation that involve
one's placement within a complexity of relationships, which one must appropriate oneself into
through the relational reciprocity of allegiance and resistance, or acceptance and remonstrance.
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Thus it seems that in lacking autonomy, attaining identity through the accumulation of social
truths and falsehoods, and possessing the capacity to influence one's context through power
relations, the Foucauldian person possesses at least some aspects of comparative interest, which
may allow Confucianism to converse more clearly with the Western world and, once Gadamer’s
relation to Foucault is understood, may clarify why correlative personhood and aesthetic
representation work well together.

2.

Foucault's comparison with Gadamer may be approached on terms similar to those in the

comparison made with Confucianism if one substitutes the concerns of the self with those
regarding the subject in works. There is a distinction Foucault makes between the author and the
subject within works, a distinction that relates in some interesting ways to Gadamer’s notions
discussed in the previous chapter. Though authors have been considered to have nearly absolute
authority over the constitution of works in the past, Foucault claims that this is not, and more so
should not be, the case. In his socio-historical analysis of the "author function," Foucault
discusses its numerous occurrences, disappearances and reoccurrences within various
mediums.11 Despite its influences as a means of interpretation, Foucault states that the author is
"the ideological figure by which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of
meaning" and if one is to uncover a work's full potential, one should instead think to themselves,
"What difference does it make who is speaking?"12 In opposition to the author function, the
subject in works is not so absolute or definite. As Foucault states, "[The subject] is not in fact the
cause, origin, or starting-point of the phenomenon of the written or spoken articulation of a
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sentence…. It is a particular, vacant place that may in fact be filled by different individuals."13
Whether it be the narrator in a work of fiction or the 'I' within a work of scientific inquiry, the
subject does not require someone to actually speak the words associated with it in order to justify
them, as the author function does. It is instead a position within the work itself that may be filled
by various individuals within various contexts.
Foucault's connections with Gadamer in this regard may seem much more indirect than
his connections with Confucianism, though those also required some investigation to uncover.
However, the connections between them concerned with art as person, and the interconnectivity
of correlative personhood and aesthetic representation, may be found after some further analysis.
The most significant of the relatable aspects within these two views are that both not only
understand works to be fundamentally separated from their authors but also attribute meaning in
works to something within the works themselves that varies according to the context and relies
on the integration of spectators. To elaborate, Foucault presents numerous questions he thinks
would be asked of a work once the author function has disappeared:
What are the modes of existence of this discourse? Where has it been used, how can it
circulate, and who can appropriate it for himself? What are the places in it where there is
room for possible subjects? Who can assume these various subject functions?14
To put it simply, Foucault’s subject does not have any actual, definite presence beyond the work
but is understood instead in relation to other discursive aspects, such that the grammatical
‘subject’ in a sentence is conceived in relation to the sentence’s ‘object.’ The result of this
subjectification, in lacking the sole authority granted to the author, is that the work begins to
speak for itself, such that its intentions can be pursued no further than the words given by the

Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith, 1972, Reprint, (New York:
Vintage Books, 2010), 95.
14
Foucault, “What is an Author?,” 222.
13

27

subject throughout its own discourses. Thus, with no exterior authority to expound upon the
intentions of the subject, the spectator must analyze the discourse and determine where and how
subjects may be appropriated within particular contexts. This contextualization and
reappropriation by the spectator resembles aspects of Gadamer’s hermeneutical conversation, for
both require the interplay of participants, namely spectators and works, to bring about aesthetic
meaning mutually.
Lastly, the aspects of language for Gadamer and Foucault should be discussed, for
Gadamer’s hermeneutics and Foucault’s discourse analysis tend to be conceived in opposition to
one another, such that even Foucault himself resisted hermeneutics in developing his analyses of
language. In their nature, Gadamer’s hermeneutics is concerned with an always-biased
conversational approach to language while Foucault’s discourse analysis concerns empirical
analyses of power and social relations. Problems arise when one considers how a contextualized
preunderstanding could work in conjunction with a discursive framework seeking to analyze
social power objectively. However, despite their potential dissociation, there are theories that
attempt to unify them. In his development of critical hermeneutics, Hans-Herbert Kögler states
that “the answer to how we can combine a contextual and pluralistic conception of meaning with
a critical analysis of power lies in a dialogic reconstruction of the interpretive effect of selfdistanciation,” such that conversations with others allow one to critically reflect upon oneself
and discern particular social relations by analyzing various self-understandings—others' and
one’s own—within a particular context.15 This attempt at a Foucauldian-Gadamerian relationship
does much for this paper’s project by making clear the aspects of these two conceptual
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frameworks that are relevant for art as person, namely their contextual understanding of
language. Hermeneutical conversation, which seeks further understanding through the
relationship between two biased perspectives, and discursive analysis, which seeks to understand
the historical development of power in social relations, both utilize language as a means to
arouse understanding within a perpetually changing world.

Having discussed Foucault's relationship to Confucianism and Gadamer, through the self
and the discursive subject respectively, the interconnectivity between correlative personhood and
aesthetic representation may now be properly developed. Previously, a quote from Foucault was
addressed concerning the subject in works, which claimed that it is "a vacant place" that can be
"filled by different individuals." In his discussion of the Foucauldian non-autonomous self,
Huijer makes reference to this same quote, such that, when concerned with language, Foucault
himself desired "to have his own 'I' become part of the anonymous murmur of the discourse."16
Thus it becomes clear that there is a foundational relationship, for Foucault, between the subject
in works and the self, for both are made a subject through language. What this relationship
entails is that the ambiguous Foucauldian self may be defined in reference to the subject in
works, for the self cannot appeal back to any one essence, such as a transcendent soul, just as the
vacant subject in works cannot appeal back to a sole authority, such as an author. As has been
stated, the Foucualdian notions discussed thus far are not synonymous with those Gadamerian
and Confucian notions and values discussed in the previous chapter. However, as I have argued,
it seems that Foucault, Gadamer and Confucianism resonate in various ways. With this stated,
one may further argue that the interrelational aspects of Foucault’s self and subject in works may
16
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in turn be applied to correlative personhood and aesthetic representation. Thus it would be the
case that aesthetically represented beings and correlatively constituted persons relate at a
foundational level for reasons similar to those that relate Foucault’s self with the subject in
works, namely their contextual constitution and lack of authoritative, unchanging influences.
These notions in Foucault’s are what lead to what he calls the aesthetics of existence, for the self,
in its subjectification, must be approached as if it were a work of art. The following section will
attempt to dissect this aesthetics of existence in order to provide an alternative 'existence of
aesthetics' that conceptualizes artworks as persons.

Existence of Aesthetics
Of art and of the envelopment of artists into the aesthetic, Friedrich Nietzsche marvels at the
god-like power of creation and how, in the moment of artistic inspiration, "[m]an is no longer an
artist, he has become a work of art."17 It is with a similar mentality that Foucault approaches his
notions of self-cultivation, expanding the horizons of concern beyond the fine arts into all
aspects of socialized and contextualized personhood. This aesthetics of existence is Foucault's
means of transforming the development of the ethical subject into an artistic process, of
aestheticizing one's existence as its name suggests. Though many of the notions within
Foucault's aesthetics of existence have been discussed previously in conjunction with Gadamer
and Confucianism, they should be addressed separately and in themselves so that a clearer
picture of Foucauldian self-cultivation may be attained. With this picture in place, one may
properly dissect it and integrate it into the framework of art as person.
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In the last section, Foucault's notion of the self was introduced briefly, which claimed
that one would be wrong in declaring the existence of an autonomous individuality. With such a
claim made, language and the subject become Foucault's means of making sense of the self, such
that one should understand the self like one does the subject in works, as a vacant space that may
be filled by various individuals. However, this alone does not provide the foundations for such a
fragmented self, so aspects like true-and-false games and power relations were introduced into
the formation in order to create a contextually formed individuality that could oppose anything
precedent or transcendent. At the center of such individuality, there would be a collection of
ever-changing truths and power relations that form together to create an entity that expresses
itself through language. All of the above aspects of Foucault's thought have been discussed
previously in one way or another. However, what constitutes the aesthetics of existence for
Foucault is its prescriptive quality, its attempt to address how such a person should cultivate
oneself ethically. According to Huijer, the aesthetics of existence may be summarized as "a
political/aesthetic filling-in of oneself, in which without any premeditated plan, without any
fixed truths or rules, one links oneself with other people and in this link or practice, tries to turn
one’s life into a work of art by being a master over oneself."18 So instead of an immutable
essence that precedes the individual and abides by ubiquitous moral principles, the individual is
formed aesthetically, in reference to a multitude of relationships within a framework where the
precepts must always be contextually reappropriated. Thus it seems that Foucault considers selfcultivation to be an aesthetic process because the self, like a painting or a symphony, must be
created without any strict guidelines beyond one's context and relations to others, it must always
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be attended to like a work of art that is always subject to scrutiny, and it should also be
something beautiful that evokes pleasure as it is formed.
With the significant aspects of Foucault's aesthetics of existence addressed, it may be
integrated into the metaphor of art as person by addressing this paper's development of artworks
and of the aesthetic subject. During the discussions of aesthetic representation, I claimed that
artworks, like correlative persons, may be understood as entities that possess contextualized
being, such that they are influenced by and are able to influence their context. Meaning for such
artworks originates from the works themselves, such that no influence outside of the works
themselves—authors included—should be granted sole authority over their intentions. They are
also always changing in their play with spectators just as people are fundamentally changing in
their relationships with others. All of these factors accumulated into what has been called art as
person, such that it was determined that it would be appropriate to address the relationship
between artworks and spectators as if it were one between persons. In Foucault's thought, the
relationship between personhood and artworks is predominantly present, for he appeals to the
nature of art and of the aesthetic subject in his subjectification of the individual. He understands
the self just as he understands the subject in works themselves, namely as language positions that
may be filled by anyone, for the essence of these positions lies in the discourse as opposed to any
particular discursive figure. This may be related back to Gadamer's claim that understanding is
achieved through language, for it is the conversation between players that evokes the mutual
developments achieved in play, such that the players dissolve and become merely aspects of play
itself. However, in appealing to the players themselves, specifically the artworks and spectators
present in the play of aesthetic representation, it seems that artworks possess numerous aspects
of Foucauldian as well as correlative personhood. Like the aspects of Foucault's individual,
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artworks are formed contextually, they possess certain truths, for they represent certain places
and figures, and one may argue that they are influenced by power relations, such that certain
works prosper in certain ways within various political regimes and social trends. Still, despite all
these major potential connections, the most significant factor as concerns the correlation between
artworks and persons is that Foucault openly constructs his notion of the self within the aesthetic
framework. The self is not constituted by transcendent ethical principles, it is not recognized by a
dissociated rationality that allows it to remain constant behind the change in the world, and it
does not exist apart from the creative and pleasurable aspects of the artistic and the aesthetic.
Instead, the ethical subject is an aesthetic subject. The introduction of this aspect of personhood
provides a new way to metaphorically personify artworks, namely by adapting those elements
that grant the ethical self aesthetic status to also grant the aesthetic work ethical subjectivity.
To again appeal to the disclaimer made in this paper's introduction, the goal here is not
to literally grant artworks the capacity for self-cultivation, such that they may consciously reflect
on their relationships. However, as discursive subjects, artworks influence their context just as
persons do. They accumulate power over others through acclaim and reputation. Within their
ever-progressing context, they lose and gain influence as power shifts from one aesthetic subject
to another, which may be observed throughout history in the grand shifting of artistic
movements, in the political influences of propaganda, and in the philosophical revelations
inspired by classic texts, such as those of Aristotle or Plato, as they are interpreted and
reappropriated within various contexts. Both artworks and persons, as vacant discursive
positions, are filled as their context progresses, are shaped by their collection of discursive
relationships, and are able to shape their relation to discourse by accumulating their collection of
relationships into a unique individuality. Similar to what was stated last chapter, there does not
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seem to be much difference between artworks and persons within the discursive framework
besides the composition of the physical body that presents the discourse. So if artworks are to be
treated as persons in their relationships, the particularly person-centered aspects of Foucault's
aesthetics of existence should be attributed to them at the moment they are engaged in
conversation and enter into the play of discourse with spectators. These aspects would be those
within the ethical dimension, which are concerned with Foucault's prescriptions of selfcultivation; since artworks are already works of art, it is the 'existence' factor of the aesthetics of
existence that one should be concerned with when integrating this notion into the metaphor of art
as person. The disclaimer should be reiterated here, for this does not entail that artworks need to
literally possess the capabilities needed for such ethical practices. They need not the ability to
reappropriate themselves within their social context through their own volition or to look upon
themselves from a distance as both an aesthetic object and subject. However, just as it was stated
at the end of the first chapter, one should approach artworks as if they possessed these capacities.
If one is to fully understand them and the depth of their influence as contextually and relationally
constituted beings, one should act as if the processes of self-cultivation applied to them, just as it
did to oneself, before one engaged them in conversation as a spectator. This way, artworks truly
become an other to one in conversation with them and one may thus better cultivate oneself in
relation to them.
There is much more to be said of this aspect of art as person, which the next chapter does
in its analysis of the ethical dimensions of aesthetic interaction. However, the essential aspects
that one should take from this chapter are that Foucault's integration into art as person as a
intermediary between Gadamer and Confucianism solidifies the interconnectivity between
aesthetic representation and correlative personhood, and that the adaptation of Foucault's
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aesthetic of existence introduces an ethical subjectivity into artworks themselves in the same way
that persons should be conceived as aesthetic subjects for Foucault. From here, the next step is to
analyze the current trends in Western philosophical dialogue as concerns the connection between
ethics and aesthetic, which makes clear that, according to art as person, these trends may need to
be reevaluated.
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III
Ethics in Art as Person

In contemporary aesthetics, there are numerous competing theories concerned with the ethical
evaluation of art, which argue how one may assess artworks ethically, if one may do so at all.
Within the framework of aesthetics introduced through the metaphor art as person, how may one
appropriately bring ethics into artistic interactions? If artworks, like persons, are correlatively
constituted subjects that are capable of altering their context through discursive/conversational
relationships with others, how can/should ethical evaluation be applied to them? This final
chapter focuses on developing the ethical implications of this metaphor by analyzing various
ethical approaches to aesthetics in order to determine what factors within them resonate best with
the understanding of aesthetic interaction in art as person. I do this by first providing an
overview of the current trends in Western aesthetics concerning the ethical evaluation of art.
Once this has been done, I discuss the approach that was briefly introduced at the end of the last
chapter in reference to Foucault's aesthetics of existence in greater detail—and in reference to the
current trends in the ethical evaluation of art—so that the aesthetic of art as person may be best
understood. To conclude this chapter, I appeal to some more broadly Chinese aesthetic practices
and then reintroduce those Confucian values discussed in the first chapter—this time focusing
particularly on their aesthetic and ethical implications—so that they may provide an alternative
set of guidelines by which to interact with artworks as correlative ‘persons.’
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Contemporary Debate
Though the aesthetic may not have been conceptually divorced from the ethical in the past, the
ideals that developed within the post-Kantian world resulted in the drastic division of aesthetics
and ethics into two autonomous value systems. Not only does Gadamer discuss this in his
analyses of the Enlightenment and Romantic periods, but so does Noël Carroll, who states that
“philosophers from Plato through Hume supposed that the pertinence of ethical criticism to art
was unproblematic,” and that “it is only since the eighteenth century that the view took hold that
the aesthetic realm and the ethical realm are each absolutely autonomous from the other.”1 Thus,
the interrelation between ethics and aesthetics in the past was not brought to the fore as a
problem in need of critical reflection, for it was either assumed that art was ethical or that it was
completely disconnected from ethics. However, in more recent discussions, the relationship
between ethics and aesthetics has become a focal point for philosophical argument. Whether for
or against the ethical evaluation of art, any views concerned with the integration of aesthetics and
ethics can no longer be assumed but must be argued for thoroughly, which has resulted in the
development of numerous theories of ethical criticism.
In order to properly introduce the theories developed in these contemporary debates, one
should begin by addressing their primary concern: should artworks be ethically evaluated at all?
The two views that tend to lead the discussions centered around this question may be called
autonomism, which "claims that ethical criticism is never legitimate since moral and aesthetic
value are autonomous," and moralism, which "reduces aesthetic value to moral value."2 The
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former of these two views is similar to those held by the post-Kantian thinkers, for it keeps the
realm of aesthetics separated and isolated from the realm of ethics, focusing instead on the pure
work of art. The latter, conversely, appeals back to the situation in pre-Kantian philosophical
thought by reintroducing ethics as the evaluative criteria for judging artworks. However, there
are various sub-categories within these two overarching views that approach and alter the
concerns of each with varying levels of intensity. The views as they are described in the
quotations above are considered more radical conceptions, and may thus be called radical
autonomism and radical moralism. Radical autonomism, as stated by Carroll, claims that "art is
intrinsically valuable, and that it is not and should not be subservient to ulterior or external
purposes."3 Art in this view becomes completely embedded within the aesthetic, such that all
other evaluative criteria—moral, social, historical—become irrelevant to the judgment of
artworks. Radical moralism, like the account given above, states that aesthetic evaluations should
be understood as moral evaluations, such that "art should only be discussed from a moral point of
view."4 Thus, the aesthetic value of artworks is dictated by their moral worth, such that morally
flawed and valuable artworks become aesthetically flawed and valuable artworks respectively.
There are, however, an assortment of problems that arise due to the radical nature of these views
on ethical criticism. Some artworks seem to possess many values other than those of pure
aesthetics, such as religious or political significance, which make the isolationist aspects of
radical autonomism seem counterintuitive. Also, some morally flawed artworks seem
aesthetically valuable while other morally valuable artworks seem aesthetically flawed, which
seems to counter the reductive aspects of radical moralism.
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Due the intuitively implausible nature of the radical views discussed above, many ethical
critics have turned their attention toward more moderate versions of autonomism and moralism.
While still opposed to the integration of aesthetics and ethics, moderate autonomism allows for
artworks to be evaluated ethically. James Anderson and Jeffrey Dean state that "both sorts of
criticism are appropriate to works of art but the categories of moral aesthetic criticism always
remain conceptually distinct."5 Ethical evaluation thus becomes a perfectly plausible way to
judge artworks, but any ethical value attributed to a work is always fundamentally detached from
its aesthetic value. This would allow artworks to properly maintain any religious or political
significance they might have by declaring that these values do not affect the aesthetic value of
this artwork qua art. Within the framework of moralism, there are two significant moderate
views currently in discussion. Moderate moralism, a view espoused by Noël Carroll, states that
"some of the relevant ethical defects in artworks can also be aesthetic defects and must be
weighed that way in all-things-considered judgments."6 Berys Gaut advocates a similar view that
may be called ethicism, which he defines as follows:
Ethicism is the thesis that the ethical assessment of attitudes manifested by works of art is
a legitimate aspect of the aesthetic evaluation of those works, such that, if a work
manifests ethically reprehensible attitudes, it is to that extent aesthetically defective, and
if a work manifest ethically commendable attitudes, it is to that extent aesthetically
meritorious.7
To compare these two views, moderate moralism makes a weaker claim than ethicism, for it
posits that only some ethical values in artworks are aesthetic while ethicism claims that they all
are. However, both of their claims are much less extreme than that of radial moralism, for they
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both allow for the existence of aesthetic values that are not essentially ethical. Other aesthetic
values may exist within these views—concerned maybe with the formal aspects of artworks—as
long as all, or at least some, ethical evaluations are considered aesthetic as well.
These moderate views of autonomism and moralism may allow artworks to be evaluated
free from the strict singularity of the radical aesthetic and ethical realms, but even these more
moderate views have certain limitations due to the emphasis they have placed on certain aspects
over others as the primary concerns of artistic evaluation. Particularly, when one speaks of
ethical evaluation within these views, one is concerned specifically with morality and the moral
claims works make, as opposed to other possible aspects of ethics. In his discussion of possible
alternative conceptions of the ethical, Gaut states that some recent thinkers have focused on
ethics in a more “broad sense," concerning themselves with how people should go about living
their lives and what constitutes a good life.8 One with such a broad conception of the ethical does
not understand it as synonymous with the moral, but locates morality within ethics as one aspect
of it. However, Gaut eventually moves past this broad conception of ethics in order to "carve out
the narrower sense" of morality from it.9 As a result of this particular focus on morality, ethical
criticism has centered its claims primarily on narrative artworks, such as novels or films. This is
because these narrative artworks make moral claims by locating characters within particular
situations and condoning or condemning their behavior within these situations, while artworks
like non-lyrical music or architecture, which lack narrative content, make no particularly obvious
moral claims. In his arguments against the autonomist claim that there should be only one
evaluative criterion by which to judge artworks, Carroll states that even though "it may be a
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mistake to engage moral discourse with reference to some pure orchestral music or some abstract
paintings," one may still morally evaluate narratives, for they "are expressly designed to elicit
moral reactions."10 This brief description of this particular debate between moderate autonomists
and moralists clarifies their artistic limitations, for autonomists exclude ethics generally from the
realm of aesthetics while moralists exclude certain artworks from general ethical consideration.
Thus, even though morality may be a significant aspect of artworks, there may be more to
discover from a broader ethical perspective.

Art as Other in Self-Cultivation
Near the end of the last chapter, I argued that, within the framework of art as person, artworks
should not only be conversed with as if they were persons but should be addressed as persons are
within the model of Foucault’s aesthetics of existence. What this entailed was that, in the same
manner that persons as ethical subjects are made aesthetic as works of art for Foucault, artworks
should be made into ethical subjects. However, I left the depth of this entailment unclear. I
claimed that artworks should not be literally conceptualized as persons but should be conversed
with as if the ethical aspects of self-cultivation applied to them so that they may be situated
appropriately as others in their relationships with spectators. To clarify, it seems proper to first
discuss the aesthetic within art as person in itself so that one may understand it at a foundational
level. Once the implications of this aesthetic have been discussed, it may then be related to those
contemporary aesthetic-ethical debates introduced in the last section, such that one may discover
what aspects of these debates resonate with or contradict the aspects of the aesthetic of art as
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person.
What does it mean for artworks to be treated as if self-cultivation applied to them? To
make sense of this, one must remember that art as person is a metaphor for how persons interact
with artworks, and one must understand that it is primarily concerned with defining the
experience of the person as spectator. Thus, artworks should not be granted the status of ethical
personhood for their own benefit but for the benefit of the spectator interacting and conversing
with them. This is not to say that artworks should be disregarded in themselves, for as Gadamer
reminds us, artworks—in the complexity of their nearly indefinite contextuality—can only be
addressed properly in themselves. Instead, what this focus on the person as spectator suggests is
that, just as the Foucauldian self is cultivated in relation to others, the self within the framework
of art as person should be cultivated in relation to artworks as others. To look back at Foucault's
cultivation of the self, he claims that within Hellenistic Greece and Imperial Rome, one
conceived "oneself in relation to one's wife, to others, to events, and to civic and political
activities—and a different way of considering oneself as a subject of one's pleasures."11
According to Foucault, one practiced sexual austerity out of respect for one's wife, governed
oneself within the political sphere out of respect for other politicians, and so forth with all other
social engagements, private or public. These power relations required one to both submit to the
power of others when appropriate and assert one's own power when necessary in order to better
these others. In constantly cultivating the self as a work of art through these social relations, one
evokes within oneself an aesthetic pleasure for oneself as the work of one’s creation. This is the
sort of aesthetic framework art as person attempts to develop for persons as spectators of
artworks. Artworks become contextually complex others that one must approach genuinely and
11
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sympathetically in order to cultivate oneself in relation to them, and the artistic becomes a realm
of ethical subjects in conversation with spectators, which allows persons to further ethicize, as
well as aestheticize, themselves in relation to artworks. The artworks may then be further
ethicized and aestheticized themselves, for one would engage them as one engages other selfcultivating persons—through allegiance and resistance. This would allow for them to be
contextual reappropriated perpetually as they continue to converse with other self-cultivating
individuals.
With the approach to artistic interaction within art as person explicated a bit further, it
may now be compared to the aspects of contemporary debates on ethical criticism so that one
may fully understand what art as person entails. As was stated in the last section, recent debates
on the ethical evaluation of art have chosen to emphasize morality as the aspect of the ethical
worth defending. Thus, narrative artworks have become the moralist's tool for confronting any
objections made by autonomists, for narratives introduce moral situations to their spectators that
ask for moral responses, and such prescriptions within artworks constitute an aesthetic quality for
the moralists. This mode of judging artworks, while interesting on many levels, can arguably be
considered digressionary as concerns the experience one has when interacting with art. It may
seem as if morality is a vital aspect of narrative artworks but it may also seem that the beauty of
some artworks overwhelms any moral flaws they might possess; Leni Riefenstahl's Triumph of
the Will is referenced often as one of these latter ambiguous works, for its seems to be both
morally horrendous and aesthetically valuable. One could argue, as many autonomists do, that
one's moral evaluations of such artworks are fundamentally separate from one's aesthetic
evaluations, thus declaring the work aesthetically valuable. One could also argue, as many
moralists do, that any aesthetic evaluations of such works are fundamentally ethical, thus
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condemning the work as both morally and aesthetically flawed. However, whether or not
philosophical inquiry aesthetically condones or condemns such artworks, these arguments do not
necessarily supersede the ambiguous experience one has when engaging them, for one may
continue to experience contrasting sensations when evaluating these works. The aesthetic within
art as person attempts to show that any ambiguity experienced when engaging artworks is not
necessarily a result of a misunderstanding that needs to be clarified, and that arguments
attempting to classify and categorize one’s evaluations are not necessary.
If one were to approach Triumph of the Will from the perspective of art as person,
conversing with the work as an other in an attempt to cultivate oneself in relation to it, one would
not limit oneself by abstracting particular aspects of the work as representative of the whole, thus
praising it or condemning it universally and absolutely. Instead, one would situate oneself within
one's context and approach the relationship accordingly. One would first converse with the work
in its contextual entirety and allow its attributes to resonate with oneself. At this point, one might
come upon the ambiguity mentioned above, such that the work seems morally flawed yet
aesthetically valuable. However, instead of attempting to determine the nature of one's
evaluations, one would instead focus on cultivating oneself in conversation with the work.
Maybe in viewing Triumph of the Will, one actualizes within oneself the horrific nature of its
manipulative elements, but also realizes that the precision of its cinematography and the careful
juxtaposition of its shots are valuable due to their capacity to inspire. Through this, one cultivates
within oneself an awareness of manipulation so as to avoid this it, and also cultivates within
oneself a respect for precision and care, with the hope of inspiring others more appropriately.
From here, one may now address the film as an other through allegiance and resistance so as to
grant it the opportunity for contextual reappropraition. One might determine that other artworks
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possess all of this film's valuable aspects without any of its flaws, such that this particular film is
no longer contextually relevant. One might also determine that the film's flaws could be
alleviated with a change of context, such that viewing it within a Holocaust museum may allow
it to speak in a way that cultivates appropriate moral development within its spectators.
One may also better understand the aesthetic aspects of art as person thus far discussed if
one appeals to the broader conception of ethics introduced in the last section. As was stated
previously, the broad sense of the ethical concerns itself generally with how one might live a
good life. In the words of Martha Nussbaum, ethics seeks to understand "what it is for a human
being to live well."12 Nussbaum also claims that ethics is a practical affair that attempts to
improve people's lives "by promoting individual clarification and self-understanding, and by
moving individuals toward communal attunement." 13 This conception of the ethical already
seems to resonate with art as person—it is situated contextually, focused on social harmony and
concerned with self-cultivation—but the implications of this ethical broadening may be taken
even further if one extends the scope of this ethic’s primary concern: how should I live? What
might be included within an ethical system with such an all-encompassing yet vague concern?
Should it take into account more Aristotelian virtues that may not be considered moral, such as
courage or patience? What about emotional responses? As Nussbaum states, “Should we
automatically mistrust the information given to us by our fear, or grief, or love?”14 What about
even more general character traits or personal skills, such as speaking powerfully or writing
elegantly? Concerning this, Gaut states that “one cannot simply take ethical qualities as any good
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or bad aspect of character,” for this would include “having a capacity to write stylishly,
beautifully or elegantly and possessing an acute aesthetic sensibility,” which he assumes to be
outside of the realm of ethics.15 Though it may seem problematic that a broad conception of
ethics may include such things, art as person would not only tolerate these various aspects but
embrace them as pivotal to the contextuality of the relationship between artworks and spectators.
If artworks, like persons, are not only relational but are constituted in their entirety by their
relationships—and if artworks are allotted the position of personified, discursive subjects in their
relationships to spectators—they attain a status of correlational complexity that abstracted moral
or aesthetic evaluations cannot sufficiently represent. To properly understand and represent an
entity that is the result of nearly indefinite correlative influences, one must recognize the
interconnectivity of these influences, such that evaluations of moral or aesthetic value cannot in
actuality be disconnected from their contextual entirety.

A Chinese Perspective
So far in this paper, I have elevated artworks to a status of great complexity in making them into
ethical subjects. I have described them as a conglomeration of contextual and social parts that
come together to form a unique yet malleable individual that not only changes with the world but
affects change within it, just as persons do. In being ethically subjectified, they must be
approached by their spectators with the sensitivity and authenticity with which one should relate
to others, for only then may artworks as others affect spectators to the fullest extent. I have also
addressed contemporary debates concerning the ethical evaluation of art in conjunction with the
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aesthetic of art as person and determined that the concerns of moralists and autonomists, in
attempting to classify artistic evaluations, seem to limit the potential artworks have to inspire
self-cultivation within spectators. If I have made anything clear, though, it is that the metaphor of
art as person is a complex notion that requires much attention, for just as persons are considered
entities of numerous and often ambiguous dispositions, artworks also possess a complexity that
must be approached with caution. With this need for cautiousness in mind, this final section
appeals once more to Confucianism—placing particular emphasis on its aesthetic and ethical
aspects—and to Chinese aesthetic practices more broadly. This is done because these Chinese
practices already have within them a correlative understanding of aesthetics and ethics, a
recognition of art as a catalyst for self-cultivation, and a set of guidelines by which to approach
artworks as well as correlative persons, which may be combined and integrated into the notion of
art as person so that this metaphor may properly conceive of its own guidelines for interacting
with artworks.
An interesting aspect of Confucian aesthetics and of Chinese aesthetics generally is their
particular interest in music. Music in classical Chinese tradition is not merely an art form that
possesses abstracted aesthetic value but is intimately connected with ethics and morality. This
emphasis on music as moral opposes those contemporary Western debates on ethical criticism
discussed previously, for they focused on narratives as the representatives of morality and placed
artworks like non-lyrical music within the realm of the non-moral. For the Confucians, however,
there is much to be gained ethically from this other, seemingly non-moral art form. Confucius, in
addressing his student Zilu, says that those who “have become refined through observing ritual
propriety (li 禮) and playing music (yue 樂)—such persons can be said to be consummate.”16
16
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The relationship here between ritual propriety and music is significant, for music, along with
other performance arts like calligraphy or dancing, are understood as practices through which
one may cultivate oneself. Eric Mullis clarifies the similarities between such aesthetic practices
and ritual propriety when he states of calligraphy that “the reciprocal process of absorbing the
characters (through repetitious practice) and expressing them is contingent upon and reflects the
work of a body that is continually being affected by and is continually affecting its social and
physical environment.”17 This body that is affected by and affects its context in writing is
embedded entirely into the world, such that discipline and health can determine the state of one's
written characters. These aspects in return reflect upon the person, for whether one is writing
characters or relating with others, one who does not practice efficiently will not act properly and
one who does not bother to be healthy will not act lucidly. Thus, in order to practice these art
forms well, one must embody those essential aspects of the Confucian ethic; one must cultivate
within oneself an awareness of one's context, master the art of reappropriating and personalizing
the past, and understand what harmonizing relational differences entails by combining various
notes into beautiful melodies or experimenting with various brush strokes in order to develop
one's own style of writing. These traits, however, not only come into play in artistic practice but
are also present when one views these artworks as a spectator. This is because one's ethical
disposition becomes an intimate part of one’s creation, such that "the viewer sees something of
the artist’s very corporality in the work and—qua embodiment—becomes tacitly aware of a high
level of somatic refinement."18 An artist's brush strokes or musical notes are intimately
connected to the artist's bodily discipline and health, such that one can see illness or a lack of
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proper training within an artwork's form as if one were observing the body of a sick and
undisciplined person.
There are many valuable aspects to be taken from the aesthetic perspective discussed
above. It applies ethical concerns to artworks like non-lyrical music or calligraphy, which are
typically considered non-moral in the West, such that both artists and spectators may be
cultivated in their relationships to these artworks. Artists, in the processes of creation, bring
numerous influences together to create unique personal expressions and styles, which allows
them to cultivate themselves through the aspects of contextualization and appropriateness present
within these artistic practices as practices of li. Spectators may then cultivate themselves when
observing these artist's works, for these works contain aspects of their authors within them and
thus express elements of cultivation, or the lack thereof, that spectators may apply to themselves.
However, this aesthetic perspective does not resonate in its entirety with that of art as person.
One problem is that this Chinese aesthetic does not grant art the status of ethical subjectivity that
the aesthetic of art as person does. The majority of artworks within the classical Chinese tradition
are understood primarily as expressions of authors, such that the authors' somatic disposition
may be recognized through them. This understanding of artworks as expressions of authors
results in the Confucian claim that "a good work of art cannot be executed by an immoral
person," since artworks are understood as expressions of artists' ethical dispositions and become
conceptually confined to these artists' dispositions. As I have stated numerous times, particularly
through Gadamer and Foucault, art as person does not grant such definitive authority to the
author—or to any one person for that matter. However, if one is able to discover ethical traits of
their authors within the works themselves, one could make an argument similar to Foucault's
opposition to the author function, namely that the works themselves are capable of presenting
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these traits without necessarily making any appeal to the author. This does not mean that authors
should not be appealed to at all during artistic interaction. On the contrary, if artworks are to be
understood as unique individuals composed of a complexity of relationships, authors may be
appealed to as one of many possible aspects of artworks as contextual, subjectified others. The
implications of the above statements may be explicated through an analysis of some particularly
interesting practices concerning Chinese paintings. In opposition to Western artistic preservation,
which attempts to maintain artworks as best as possible in their original condition, Chinese
aesthetic practices understand artworks as “organic, growing form[s]” that are always in the
process of being created.19 As a result of this, practices developed within the tradition of Chinese
painting that involved modifying paintings by adding “signatures, inscriptions, seals, colophons,
titles, labels, and so forth,” all of which could be added by the authors themselves or by other
persons, from contemporary critics to future admirers and collectors.20 These Chinese paintings
could thus be sustained in a state perpetual transformation by being quite literally changed in
their relationships to spectators. Now even though other artworks may not be changed as
obviously or as intentionally as these Chinese paintings are, they may also be understood as
transformative. As artworks progress, they take on a multitude of meanings, affecting their
spectators and being thus affected by them in return within the continuous play of artistic
interaction. Even if one attempts to preserve the original status of a work, the fact that the entire
context within which that work is embedded is always changing makes the work’s
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transformation unavoidable. The artwork will take on new meaning as the world shapes it and it
will in turn affect the world in new ways as its collection of relationships expands.
However, that one may argue that artworks are transformative and not confined to the
expressions of their authors does not necessarily imply that they should be understood as ethical
subjects. One might just as easily approach artwork as objects that take on new meaning as
subjects modify them. Also, if artworks can be understood as subjects, why not approach all
things that are typically considered objects as subjects? Concerning this second issue, artworks
are elevated to the status of subjectivity because of their location within the discursive
framework. When one interacts with an artwork, one engages it with hermeneutic sensitivity,
conversing with it in such a way that one’s dispositions may be altered or improved. When one
interacts with objects, however, one typically acts upon them as subjects, such that the
relationship is not reciprocal but partial to the position of subjectivity. This partiality of the
subject-object relationship provides the means to understand what art as person intends through
its subjectification of artworks. In the description of Chinese painting given above, though these
paintings were understood as constantly progressing, Chinese persons would not have considered
them subjects. Instead, they would be understood them as conversational mediums, ways for
spectators to understand not only the dispositions of the original artists but of the various other
persons who engaged the work in the past as well. This implies that all these relationships remain
distinct within the artworks, such that interacting with these paintings would be like interacting
with these various other people who have come into contact with them. However, if artworks are
engaged through art as person, these relationships would dissipate into the unique individuality
that is the artwork itself. When one engages music or calligraphy and determines the artists’
dispositions, one would really be determining the dispositions of the artworks themselves, for the
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artists may have developed in a different direction or the artworks themselves may be presenting
different meanings in different situations than the one they were created in. As for the Chinese
paintings, these artworks would most obviously display their correlative subjectivity. The
influences that these paintings have accumulated form unique individuals—influenced by
multiple persons within multiple artistic mediums—that do not connect solely to any of those
persons that modified it. Instead, they integrate all these aspects into unified positions that then
project their uniqueness and originality back into the world. In this respect, they are no different
than persons conceptualized within a correlative framework, for such persons are only their
unique collection of relationships and are only innovative because these relationships form into a
unique individual. The only attribute persons possess that would set them apart as subjects is
their capacity for language, which is one more reason why art as person is not an ontological
claim. When artworks are engaged in conversation, however, they are granted entry into the
discursive framework, so in that moment they may be understood properly as discursive ethical
subjects.
Since art as person has determined that artworks should be approached in themselves as
personified ethical subjects, the values of Confucianism concerned with the ethical development
of persons may be added to the aspects of Chinese aesthetics introduced above in order to
develop a set of guidelines for artistic interaction that fully capture the depth of artworks as
relationally constituted others. Just as was stated before, the first and most pivotal of these
values is ren, or consummate and authoritative conduct, for it concerns the disposition of the
person cultivating oneself as a spectator. Persons of ren become authorities and authors within
their context, accumulating their particular collection of relationships into unique individualities
that inspire others and incite innovation within their context. Applying this to aesthetic
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interaction, one must approach artworks as a person of ren would approach others, with a
cultivated awareness of the context within which they both reside as well as the ability to
appropriately accept and remonstrate with the claims artworks make. Such a person must also
grant artworks the opportunity to affect one's own disposition as well so that they both may
improve upon each other in their correlative interactions. The implications of li for artworks
within Confucianism were discussed above, for artistic skills may be practiced in order to
cultivate ritual propriety and one may observe ethical traits within artworks in order to discover
which stylistic choices one may emulate in the development of ren. However, if li is applied to
artworks in the same way it is applied to relationships with other persons, another implication
arises. As was stated of li in the first chapter, it requires one to appropriate one's actions within
various social contexts and if artworks are to be treated as persons, they must also be given the
opportunity to be appropriated in themselves. You may initially think that it is inappropriate to
play polka music at a funeral. However, this may be the funeral of a close friend with whom you
bonded through polka music. So if this music was played with this relationship in mind, it may
take on a new meaning and in turn evoke something new within you. As for he, it also becomes
intensified if the relationship between artworks and spectators becomes like one between
persons. Of aesthetic distance in Chinese aesthetics, Sarah Mattice states:
The role of harmony or unity in distance is to emphasize the fact that aesthetic experience
involves a relationship of closeness, where the parts—artist, work, and participant—
interact in such a way as to make balanced engagement possible. No one element in
aesthetic experience overrides the others.21
Though artworks would not typically be granted the status of correlative personhood within the
Chinese tradition, it seems their personification could only intensify the spectrum of correlative
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relationships. If the trinity of artists, artworks and spectators is to be one that harmonizes these
elements to the fullest extent, each one of these elements must have something unique and
interesting to offer into their correlative interaction; the more notes there are in a musical
harmony, the more complex the emotion they can express. If artworks are understood merely as
windows into the ethical dispositions of particular persons rather than being approached in
themselves, then this trinity would be more like a duality that only utilizes artworks as a
conversational medium, as was stated before. However, if artworks are granted the ethical
subjectivity of correlative personhood, they may incorporate themselves into this relational
framework in all their complexity, as unique individuals that are more than just reflections,
which provides persons with more relational opportunities through which they may more fully
cultivate themselves.
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Conclusion

To reiterate those words that began this paper, we are surrounded by art. It is one thing for this to
mean that we are surrounded by the objects of personal expression, such that we are able to
converse through space and time with persons from distant lands and eras. However, if artworks
are elevated to the status of ethical subjectivity, we embrace contextuality to the fullest, allowing
these works to live, grow, breed and die as they make their way in the world. In their interactions
with persons—artists, collectors, translators, censors, general viewers—they may both mold and
be molded. As they progress through their context, they become more complex with each new
moment, encountering new spectators, new settings and new cultures that they may integrate into
themselves and be integrated into. By discussing Gadamer's views on aesthetic representation
and correlative personhood in Confucianism, by analyzing these views in relation to Foucault
and improving them through the aesthetics of existence, in contrasting the resulting aesthetic
conception with contemporary Western ethical criticism, and in appealing again to Confucianism
from an aesthetic and ethical perspective, I hope to have clarified what it is art as person entails
and why it might be worth consideration. Like infants who are born unto the world full of
potential, who enter the world raw and malleable then bud into complex and unique individuals
as they form relationships with others, artworks possess a developmental and relational
complexity that provides them with the potential to change the world. However, if one is lacking
contextual awareness in one's aesthetic approach, such that one does not recognize the totality of
one's context with these aesthetic interactions, then this potential will be lost.
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